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Allied submarines in the Pacific War
Allied submarines were used extensively during the Pacific War and were a key contributor to the defeat of the Empire of Japan. During the war, submarines of the United States Navy were responsible for 55% of Japan's merchant marine losses; other Allied navies added to the toll. The war against shipping was the single most decisive factor in the collapse of the Japanese economy. Allied submarines also conducted reconnaissance patrols, landed special forces and guerrilla troops and performed search and rescue tasks.〔Blair, Clay, Jr. ''Silent Victory'' (Bantam, 1947), pp.508, 521–2, 568, 574, 576, 609, 646, 724, 745–6, 784, 806, 818, 825, 827, 829, 842, 865–6, & 868–9.〕 The majority of the submarines involved were from the U.S. Navy, with the British Royal Navy committing the second largest amount of boats and the Royal Netherlands Navy contributing smaller numbers of boats.
The Allied submarine campaign is one of the least-publicized feats in military history,〔 due in large part to the efforts of Allied governments to ensure their own submarines' actions were not reported in the media. The U.S. Navy adopted an official policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, and it appears the policy was executed without the knowledge or prior consent of the government.〔Holwitt, Joel I. ''"Execute Against Japan"'', Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 2005, pp.212–217 & 232–249 ''passim''.〕 The London Naval Treaty, to which the U.S. was signatory,〔Holwitt, ''passim''.〕 required submarines to abide by prize rules (commonly known as "cruiser rules"). It did not prohibit arming merchantmen,〔Holwitt, p.6.〕 but arming them, or having them report contact with submarines (or raiders), made them ''de facto'' naval auxiliaries and removed the protection of the cruiser rules.〔Dönitz, Karl. ''Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days''; von der Poorten, Edward P. ''The German Navy in World War II'' (T. Y. Crowell, 1969); Milner, Marc. ''North Atlantic run: the Royal Canadian Navy and the battle for the convoys'' (Vanwell Publishing, 2006)〕 This made restrictions on submarines effectively moot.〔Holwitt, p.6.〕
==Strategic implications==
Throughout the war, Japan was dependent on sea transport to provide adequate resources, including food, to the home islands and supply its military at garrisons across the Pacific. Before the war, Japan estimated the nation required of shipping to maintain the domestic economy and military during a major war, which was considerably less than the of shipping in the Japanese merchant fleet and of smaller craft at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor.〔Parillo (1993), pg 37–38.〕 Despite the awareness that shipping was vital, the Japanese military accorded anti-submarine warfare a low priority and allocated few warships and aircraft to protecting merchant shipping〔Parillo (1993), pg 63–73.〕 For instance, their destroyers had deficiencies in sonar and radar compared to equivalents of other navies, despite their impressive night fighting capabilities, even though these warships formed the bulk of convoy protection.〔(Japanese Destroyers )〕 Moreover, Japanese Navy doctrine in relation to commerce defense was derisively bad.〔Parillo; Peattie & Evans, ''Kaigun''.〕 The Japanese also seriously underestimated the threat from Allied submarines, whose ineffectiveness in the early part of the war〔Blair, ''Silent Victory'', p.439.〕 reinforced Japanese overconfidence.〔Parillo.〕
The size and effectiveness of the Allied submarine force increased greatly during the Pacific War. At the start of the war, a high proportion of the submarines deployed against the Japanese were obsolete, and U.S. boats were hampered by defects in their primary weapon, the Mark 14 torpedo, as well as by poor training (an excessive reliance on sonar, due to an undue fear of destroyers' sonar and aircraft),〔Blair, ''Silent Victory'', p.156.〕 insufficiently aggressive skippers,〔Blair, ''Silent Victory'', pp.361, 553, & ''passim''.〕 poor dispositions (scattered on close surveillance of Japan's major bases),〔Blair, ''Silent Victory'', pp.361 & 551.〕 and divided command (which kept submarines out of one of the best hunting areas, the Luzon Strait, for fear of friendly fire).〔Blair, ''Silent Victory'', pp.509 ''et al.''.〕 Growing numbers of modern submarines became available from 1942 onwards. The efforts of Admiral Charles A. Lockwood were crucial for the rectification of the Mark 14's problems (which were nevertheless not resolved until September 1943),〔 and for the selection of more aggressive submarine skippers. As a result of all of these developments, assisted by signals intelligence (breaking the "''maru'' code" in January 1943, after a gaffe by U.S. Customs prewar had caused Japan to change it),〔Blair; Farago, ''Broken Seal''.〕 U.S. submarines inflicted devastating losses on Japanese merchant shipping in 1943 and 1944. In conjunction with attacks by aircraft, including aerial minelaying in Operation Starvation, U.S. submarines had effectively destroyed the Japanese merchant fleet by January 1945.〔Blair, pp.819 & 967ff.〕 Poor torpedoes claimed at least two U.S. submarines〔 to the Mk14, to the Mk18, both from circular runs; given the prevalence of circulars, there were probably others. Blair, ''Silent Victory''.〕 out of 42 lost on patrol.〔Not counting those lost to friendly fire, stranding, accidents, and known losses to circular runs, nor those lost in the Atlantic, which account for the rest. Blair, ''Silent Victory'', pp.991–92.〕
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